Why the EU’s recovery fund should be permanent- Report Greece

Η ελληνική οικονομία συρρικνώθηκε κατά 8,2 τοις εκατό το 2020. Ενώ ο ΟΟΣΑ προβλέπει ότι η αύξηση του ΑΕΠ θα φθάσει στο 3,8 τοις εκατό το 2021 και στο 5 τοις εκατό το 2022, το κατά κεφαλήν ΑΕΠ προβλέπεται να φτάσει τα προ της κρίσης επίπεδα μόνο μετά τα μέσα 2022, σημειώνει αξιολόγηση του Κέντρου Ευρωπαϊκής Μεταρρύθμισης σχετικά με το ταμείο ανάκαμψης  της Ε.Ε. και τις επιπτώσεις ανα χώρα.   Όπως τονίζει,  μεταξύ άλλων,  «η  απασχόληση παραμένει χαμηλή σε σχέση με τον μέσο όρο του ΟΟΣΑ, ιδιαίτερα μεταξύ των γυναικών, και αυτό μεταφράζεται σε υψηλά ποσοστά φτώχειας.»

 
Αναλυτικά στο πρωτότυπο: Report για την Ελλάδα

• In the paper that follows, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the €720 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – also known as the EU’s recovery fund. We assess its macroeconomic effects, how important it could be for the EU’s climate ambitions, and its effects on growth. Our assessment is broadly positive.
• The recovery fund is neither the macroeconomic damp squib of its critics, nor the Hamiltonian moment of its champions. The big net recipients from the fund – Italy, Poland, Spain, Romania and other Southern and Central European countries – will receive transfers of between 0.6 and 1.9 per cent of GDP per year to 2026. These grants could bring Southern Europe’s public investment rates closer to those seen in the 2000s, if they are used for additional spending (and not to replace existing spending plans). As long as the spending is additional, it will appreciably raise growth rates – an impact that will peak in 2023 and 2024.
• The fund is not large enough to be a climate game-changer, however. Total spending on climate under the fund will be €45 billion a year, while according to the EU and member-states’ own estimates, public investment will have to reach approximately €460 billion a year across the EU to meet 2030 emissions targets. The French government has estimated that its France Relance plan will only reduce emissions by 1 per cent by 2030.
• Member-states have made many sensible reform proposals to improve Europe’s fraying social cohesion. These include measures to reduce the large number of young people and women on temporary contracts in some countries. Many member-states are investing in childcare capacity, which will raise employment rates, household income and tax revenues. However, the recovery fund may only be spent on one-off investments, so member-states will also need to raise current spending, funded through taxation. More nursery places will require the states to fund more childcare workers’ salaries, for example.
• Member-states’ plans for the other big spending line – ‘digitising’ the economy and state – contain some sensible proposals, especially to improve citizens’ access to public services and grants for early-stage ventures and research in digital technology. But some projects, such as cloud computing, and chip design and manufacturing, are already dominated by Asian and American companies, and the EU’s chances of creating successful rivals are slim.
• Conditionality under the fund is likely to be far more effective than under the EU budget. Unlike the EU budget – the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – the recovery fund has a continuous system of conditionality, with tranches of money being disbursed after reform and investment milestones have been met.
• The recovery fund should be made permanent, and after the current fund ends in 2026, larger. To meet climate targets, EU governments, businesses and households will need to invest more than €1 trillion annually throughout the 2020s, and the recovery fund provides cheaper funding than many governments achieve when borrowing on their own account. Joint borrowing and transfers between member-states are justified because climate change is a cross-border issue. To make an appreciable difference to the fight against climate change, the RRF should provide at least €230 billion of the €460 billion public investment needed annually, to ensure that Europeans collectively bear a chunk of the costs of climate action; climate action is achieved with the lowest possible borrowing costs; richer member-states pay more; and national parliaments and taxpayers have ‘skin in the game’.
• A larger recovery fund would have more sizeable macroeconomic benefits. The structural forces reducing interest rates, inflation and growth have not gone away. Higher public investment is a key tool to raise spending across the economy.
• We also recommend that the recovery fund’s superior form of conditionality is extended to the MFF, and applied to regional development spending and farm subsidies. Waste and cronyism, particularly but not only in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, would be curbed by stronger oversight by the EU’s institutions. Some farm payments undermine the EU’s climate goals by subsidising a high-emissions sector, and national governments retain too much power over who receives subsidies.
• The second half of the policy brief consists of country reports on the recovery plans of the eight largest recipients of recovery fund spending: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain. Click on these countries in the map below for some key facts and figures, and for links to the country reports.

 
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Πηγή: cer.eu