Macron and Trump: Two peas in a pod?

When France rejected Marine Le Pen by electing Emmanuel Macron president in May, political observers exhaled in relief that la République had rejected its homegrown Trump-like populist candidate. Perhaps they shouldn’t have exhaled so deeply: As Macron passed his own 100 days in office this week, the difficult realities of governing versus campaigning have highlighted more than one similarity between President Macron and President Trump. Both novices in elected office, each has suffered their share of blunders since their inauguration, with low approval ratings to match. But in their different ways, each has also tried to work outside the traditional structures of party politics, and arguably it’s on that screw that their common challenges turn.

Macron promised on the campaign trail that electing him would usher in a democratic revolutionthat would renew France’s politics, society, and economy. His dégagisme — “throw out the bums” — refrain, like Trump’s “drain the swamp,” targeted the career politicians, the traditional parties on the left and right, and the “business as usual” model of politics. Macron took this one step further, however, and abandoned his party to form, pointedly, a political movement. His En Marche was meant to be a “return to civil society,” which would push forward candidates for legislative office from all divisions of society and with backgrounds in “real life,” not traditional politics. Such candidates and the voters behind them, Macron thought, would represent something anew, a “radical center” of sorts, magically blending elements of the right and the left.

Macron won the presidency backed by this movement, but thanks in no small part to the traditional parties exacerbating their inner divisions and weak sense of political direction by adopting American-style primaries, as our recent study of French elections found. The “Macronistas” also won their legislative races handily, prompting breathless speculation about the dawn of a political revolution finally turning into legitimate daylight. But whether or not Macron’s (now official) party really does represent the French center, the center doesn’t appear able to hold together enough to enact Macron’s agenda. Infighting and administrative chaos have marked the short summer parliamentary session, highlighted by some En March deputies arriving too late to cast their votes, and others (mistakenly) voting against their party’s own proposals.

Macron’s attempts to mold the government to his will and impose order on his new rank and file have actually accelerated his declining poll numbers, (currently 36%, according to French pollster Ifop, down from 66% in May). A series of unpopular policy announcements have contributed, but it was Macron’s treatment of Pierre de Villiers, France’s top military officer and armed forces’ chief of staff, which shocked the public because it so blatantly illustrated Macron’s stated philosophy of governing. “I am the boss,” he publicly schooled the French generals, telling them he was not interested in their input about defense budget cuts. At a special joint session staged at the Sun King’s Versailles palace outside Paris, Macron elaborated: If parliament doesn’t do what he wants quickly enough, he will force it through by putting matters directly to voters in a referendum. France’s newspapers suddenly recalled that during the campaign, Macron had mused about governing France like the Roman god Jupiter: distant but dignified, the decisive source of action, to be wondered at and held in awe.

Macron, in other words, is making good on the promise of his campaign style, which was deliberately centered on, and driven by, his personality rather than a party or specific policy platform. That is one way to be president, but as his (earthly) model General Charles de Gaulle found out, one short on longevity. De Gaulle designed the semi-monarchical presidency of the Fifth Republic in order to unite the French public behind his leadership in 1958 by ruling above party divisions, but the rest of the story is that the demands of actually governing required those parties; De Gaulle was forced into an unwelcome run-off ballot in 1965, and had to resign four years later from the presidency after losing a referendum vote.

It’s not a strict parallel, of course, with President Trump. But as an outsider to Washington, a late arrival to the political party of which he became presidential candidate, Trump like Macron seems to be relying more and more on the strength of his personality to try and shape Congress’ legislative outcomes. The structures of political parties in America and France are clearly weakened, and the parties in need of reform. France more easily avoids such reform by simply forming a new political party. American-styled democracy is not so conducive to a third-party system, encouraging nontraditional candidates to “rent the party” in order to realize their presidential ambitions, heightening the role their individual personality plays in the campaign. But, as Macron and Trump are beginning to discover, being effective in office seems to require something much more like politics as usual than personality-driven governance can muster.

Πηγή: American Enterprise Institute