The worries of war
In a new paper, a senior European Union economist suggests anew that the political upheaval on both sides of the Atlantic could erupt into World War III, a danger that numerous scholars and politicians have flagged for a couple of years.
In his paper, however, Gerhard Hanappi, a professor at the Institute for Mathematical Models in Economics at the Vienna University of Technology, describes how such a war could unfold:
Between the U.S., Russia and China
In the form of multiple, small civil wars within countries
Between poorer and richer nations of the world
I emailed a few geopolitical specialists about Hanappi’s forecast. Most were scornful — Brookings’ Robert Kagan called him “loopy” and Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations said, “I can’t see why you would give this that much attention.” But all went on to offer their own view of the prospect of war.
Here are excerpts:
Ian Bremmer, president, Eurasia Group
“He’s not really forecasting WWIII. He’s saying global conflict is far more likely given the rise of nationalism/authoritarianism and its disintegrating impact on global capitalism. With that caveat, I agree with him. We’re on a path to far more global violence and deprivation, despite all the breakthroughs to alleviate poverty and advance well being, because the geopolitical order is falling apart. And the tail risks of all three of his global conflict scenarios are increasing accordingly.”
Mathew Burrows, Atlantic Council
“I certainly do worry that we could be headed for war if we don’t watch out. I don’t believe it is inevitable. But as World War I showed, you can stumble into war — a war which nobody wants. We are still a ways away — somewhere in the 1890s by my estimation. But there is too much lighthearted warmongering. And we seem to believe that China has no business being a global power, rather than accepting that the world won’t be just the U.S.’s oyster forever.”
Robert Kagan, Brookings
“To say that capitalism is ‘disintegrating’ because of the rise of nationalism/authoritarianism is historically dubious. Did capitalism disintegrate when nationalism/authoritarianism were dominant forces between 1800 and 1945? No. It eventually rose to take over the world. Geopolitics is critical to the equation. To say that ‘capitalism is disintegrating’ is different from saying we are returning to geopolitical competition over spheres of influence and to the historic divide between democracies and authoritarians. And the two together suggest increasing likelihood of conflict, especially if Americans are not interested in deterrence any more.”
Richard Haass, Council on Foreign Relations
“The internal challenges capitalist/developed/democratic countries are facing are real and could threaten social cohesion and our willingness and ability to tackle international challenges. (The) situation [is] worse than it was, which is what you’d expect a guy who wrote a book about disarray to say.”
“The odds for something happening somewhere have gone up, but [it’s] impossible to predict exactly what and when and impossible to predict how it might unfold.”
Πηγή: axios.com
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After the responsible stakeholder, what? Debating America’s China strategy
The Trump era has upended many aspects of U.S. statecraft, not least among them America’s China policy. For 25 years after the Cold War, the United States executed a largely bipartisan approach to managing a rising China. This strategy was based on the idea that a combination of persistent engagement and prudent hedging would ultimately socialize Beijing into the American-led international order. In recent years, however, that strategy unraveled as China became more repressive internally and grew stronger and more assertive externally. In response, the Trump administration has proclaimed the “responsible stakeholder” strategy dead and argued that Washington must get serious about competing with Beijing.
Yet, competition is not an end in itself. Despite the emerging consensus that Washington’s old strategy has failed, there is little agreement on what should replace it. What, exactly, does America seek to achieve vis-à-vis China? Should U.S. leaders indefinitely contain Chinese geopolitical influence? Force the “breakup or mellowing” of Chinese power? Pursue a grand bargain with the Chinese Communist Party? These are fundamental questions, which the administration has yet to answer.
There are four basic options for resetting America’s China policy: accommodation, collective balancing, comprehensive pressure, and regime change. These options are ideal-types: They illustrate the range of possible approaches and capture distinct analytical logics about the nature of the China problem and the appropriate response. At one extreme, Washington could seek an accommodation with Beijing in hopes of striking a grand bargain and establishing a cooperative long-term relationship. At the other extreme, the United States could seek regime change or even precipitate a military showdown to prevent China from growing more powerful. Both of these options assume that America must take urgent action to “solve” the China challenge. Yet, neither of these approaches is realistic, and, in fact, each is downright dangerous.
The real debate involves the two middle options: collective balancing and comprehensive pressure. Collective balancing would rely on U.S. cooperation with allies and partners to prevent China from constructing a regional sphere of influence or displacing the United States as the world’s leading power. Comprehensive pressure would go further, attempting not simply to counter-balance Chinese influence overseas but to actively erode China’s underlying political, economic, and military power. These options, in turn, rest on different fundamental assumptions. Collective balancing accepts that Chinese power is likely to expand but assumes that it is possible to prevent Beijing from using its power in destabilizing ways. Comprehensive pressure assumes that China’s power must be limited and even diminished, despite the risk that doing so will sharply escalate tensions. Probing the logic of these strategies, and assessing their various strengths and weaknesses, is critical to going beyond “competition” and adopting a new approach. The alternative — practicing tactics without strategy — is no way to confront the daunting geopolitical challenge that China presents.
Read the full piece here.
Πηγή: aei.org
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